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I. INTRODUCTION
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Most Americans know the gist of what is typically
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referred to as the “Takings Clause”—it is the idea that the
government cannot take your property without paying for it.
Specifically, after commanding a slew of other “don’ts,” the
Fifth Amendment concludes by providing “. . . nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.”2 Note, the Clause does not grant a power to
take private property, it merely confirms the pre-existing
power and prescribes two conditions: (1) public use, and (2)
just compensation.

Consequently, the government is

generally required to pay for your property if they take it for
“public use.”3
So, what’s there to argue about? It seems cut and dry.
Wouldn’t the Constitution require the government to pay a
property owner if a law, ordinance, or other act takes the
property or prevents the owner’s use thereof? Like any good
response to a legal question, the answer is: it depends. This
essay will explain on what terms and for what reasons the
answer is “it depends.”
To make the topic more practical and timelier, this
essay will explain how recent orders in Tennessee related to

2
3

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
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the COVID-19 Pandemic may implicate the Takings Clause,
which arguments, if any, may render a successful takings
claim, and which arguments for a taking should be steered
clear of. The author hopes to explain to business owners,
individuals, and organizations how and why their business,
livelihood, or property could be “taken” or regulated out of
existence in the name of COVID-19—and whether they are
owed “just compensation.”4
To contribute to legal scholarship, this essay will
introduce the topic in Part II by providing a general
historical overview of constitutional takings precedent and
the different types of takings. Next, in Part III, the essay will
address orders related to the COVID-19 Pandemic—
sometimes called “lockdown orders”—in Tennessee, a state
which falls on the conservative end of the lockdown-order
spectrum. Finally, the essay will conclude in Part IV by
addressing the concerns of businesses and their satisfaction
with the results of the preceding parts.
In sum, the essay hopes to provide a helpful and
practical description of the Takings Clause and how that

4

Id.
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Clause applies to recent lockdown orders aimed at curbing
the effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE IN APPLICATION
A. THE CLAUSE AND ITS HISTORY
It is always beneficial to start (again) with the text of
the Constitution when analyzing a Takings Clause issue.
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”5 As Chief Justice Roberts recently
recounted, when the Founders included this Clause in the
Fifth Amendment, “[they] recognized that the protection of
private property is indispensable to the promotion of
individual freedom.”6 One of those Founders, John Adams,
phrased the importance of the Clause in even fewer words:
“[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.”7
Of course, the American Founders did not themselves
contrive the idea that rights in property were independent of

Id. It is also worth pointing out the Tennessee Constitution’s
language: “That no man's particular services shall be demanded,
or property taken, or applied to public use, without the consent of
his representatives, or without just compensation being made
therefor[].” TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21.
6 Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (2021).
7 Id. (citing JOHN ADAMS, Discourses on Davila, 6 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 280 (C. Adams ed., 1851)).
5
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government, or at least independent of royal decree. Earlier
philosophers and legal scholars like John Locke and William
Blackstone deserve proper recognition for their preeminent
roles in providing popular, intellectual support for these
now-foundational principles of the American Republic.8
There is, however, significant reason to believe that
other jurisprudent philosophers and writers of the preColonial

era

would

not

have

shared

the

modern

interpretation of the language used in the American
Constitution.9 For example, Hugo Grotius, an early writer on
political philosophy, was a stalwart advocate of the principle
behind the compensation clause, but even he believed in
limitations on the practice.10 Another early and influential
thinker wrote that “[m]en are obliged naturally to assist each
other as much as possible, and to contribute to the perfection
and happiness of the fellow creatures . . .” by buying and

See generally, JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 197
(Thomas Hollis ed., 1764); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766) (discussing general rights in
property).
9 See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36,
54-57 (1964).
10 See HUGO GROTIUS, 2 ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 2 § 19
(1625) (writing that “all men” have the right to purchase property
at a “reasonable price”).
8
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selling property at “a reasonable price from those who have
themselves no occasion for [it].”11
For this reason, a sect of modern scholars criticize the
modern takings doctrine and believe that government is not
required to maintain the status quo (or even a beneficial use)
of property ownership with respect to profit-seeking
activities—that is, if the government acts through regulation
instead of condemnation.12 Thus, to the extent that the preAmerican understanding was, as those scholars believe,
intended to compensate only physical (as opposed to
regulatory) takings, American jurisprudence has charted a
new course.13
The central tenet of the Takings Clause was
expressed most succinctly by Justice Hugo Black: “The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”14 However, the

EMER DE VATTEL, 1 THE LAW OF NATIONS 20 § 244 (1758).
See generally Sax, supra note 9.
13 See infra Part II.B.
14 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
11
12
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Court has been “unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by
the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.”15 In large part, the
determination of whether a taking is subject to compensation
under the Fifth Amendment is based on how the courts
classify it – as a per se, regulatory, exaction, or nuisance
issue. For that reason, respective tests have developed to
allow the court a basis for their decisions.
The preliminary inquiry as to whether a citizen is
owed compensation turns on whether a taking has been
effectuated.16 Only then would the secondary question—
whether the compensation, if any was provided, was “just”—
need to be answered.17

18

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
16 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 151.
17 Id.
18 Some would argue that even if COVID-19 restrictions on
businesses and individuals were a taking, a suit would nonetheless
be superfluous. Their reason? Just compensation has already been
provided in the form of government payments throughout the
Pandemic. Undeniably, government assistance was provided to
employers via the Paycheck Protection Program. See Paycheck
Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, 116 Pub. L. No. 142,
134 Stat. 641 (2020). Moreover, qualified individuals received
15
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B. DISTINCTIONS AMONGST TAKINGS TYPES

Some takings are clearer than others. For the clearest
form of a taking, think of a physical taking by the
government—one where the government uses its power of
eminent domain to formally condemn and take title to
property.19 An example may be the government taking your
roadside ditch to expand a pre-existing highway. Consider
also the government’s occupation of property, perhaps by
repeatedly causing it to flood as a result of building a dam.20
Any of those would be a physical taking. Compare that
“clearest sort of taking”21 with another, more indirect, form—
regulatory takings—where the government hasn’t taken title
to the land, but its acts have undoubtedly affected it.22

multiple stimulus payments throughout the Pandemic. Still,
however, whether those funds would be designated as the “just
compensation” demanded by the Fifth Amendment is a question
left for another day. Readers should keep in mind that this essay,
in discussing the Takings Clause, assumes that no just
compensation has been provided.
19 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
374-75 (1945); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 11517 (1951).
20 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917).
21 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
22 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).
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So, you have physical takings and regulatory takings;

this article will primarily address the latter.23 Regulatory
takings themselves vary in types, with more than one per se
rule to guide the analysis. First, a regulation that installs a
“permanent physical occupation” on the property is a
taking.24 Second, a legitimate regulation promulgated under
the state’s police power that controls a “nuisance” is never a
taking.25
Apart from those two rules, the Supreme Court has,
since 1922, developed an approach to determining whether a
government regulation goes “too far” to not be considered a
taking.26 Generally speaking, the “too far” test enunciated by
Justice Holmes27 now applies to property use restrictions like

Government, save the federal government’s invocation of the
Defense Production Act, see Exec. Order No. 13,911, 85 Fed. Reg.
18,403 (Mar. 27, 2020), primarily acted to regulate businesses, not
to step in and operate them in place of their owners.
24 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982).
25 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412 (1915) (analyzing the
plaintiff’s position in light of the decision of the Court in Reinman
v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), but holding that a regulation
aimed at controlling a specific nuisance would be different than “if
the ordinance were broader” and applied to a class of properties; a
decision on which the Court simply stated: “we reserve
[judgment].”). In sum, nuisance is the key term for this per se rule,
and it does not dispel the question addressed herein with regard to
COVID-19 lockdown orders.
26 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
27 Id.
23
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zoning ordinances,28 mining restrictions,29 and the use of
property to sell certain items (say, eagle feathers 30).
To aid in the determination as to whether a
regulation has gone “too far,” courts generally apply the
“Penn Central test.” Under this test, courts weigh a number
of factors, including (1) the economic impact of the
regulation, (2) the regulation’s interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the
government action.31 When the balance of this “essentially
ad hoc”32 inquiry leans toward a regulation that goes “too
far,”33 courts will generally find a taking.34 If the government
acts through regulation (not formal condemnation) but still
physically appropriates property, it is no argument to say
that a physical taking has not occurred—whenever physical
appropriation has occurred, there is a per se taking and Penn
Central has no place.35

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88
(1926).
29 United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958).
30 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
31 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
32 Id.
33 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
34 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
35 Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021).
28
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Few could argue that so-called lockdown orders,

regulations aimed at prolonging the COVID-19 Pandemic so
as to not overwhelm hospitals and medical service providers,
physically appropriate property.36
As a general matter, lockdown orders prevented the
exercise of some properties’ intended uses. There is no
apparent “permanent physical occupation,”37 and no physical
appropriation of property appears to exist. Moreover, not
only do the regulations to be discussed hereinafter not
encroach on an owner’s right to exclude, they generally
prevent

a

property

owner’s

once-taken-for-granted

opportunity to allow others onto his property. This is not a
physical appropriation but a regulation on the use and
enjoyment of property. Thus, the question turns on whether
a regulatory taking has occurred. For that reason, it is
important to explore the regulatory takings doctrine a bit
further.

C. REGULATORY TAKINGS EXPLORED

See supra text accompanying note 23.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982) (addressing a government regulation that required the
property owner to allow a cable company to install its equipment
on the property).
36
37
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Before digging deeper on regulatory takings, it is
worth reiterating the maxim coined by Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal: “while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if [a] regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”38 Thus, to determine whether a
regulation goes too far, courts must analyze the regulation
itself.
“In view of the nearly infinite variety of ways in which
government actions or regulations can affect property
interests, the Court has recognized few invariable rules in
this area.”39 Still, the Court has drawn some clear lines on
regulations
occupations40

that
and

are

takings—permanent

permanent

deprivations

physical
of

all

economically beneficial use41 are both examples. Because
they carry with them a “heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service

Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568, U.S. 23, 31
(2012).
40 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
41 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992). See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
38
39
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under the guise of mitigating serious public harm,” Justice
Scalia wrote, “when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, . . . he has suffered a taking.”42
Otherwise, most takings claims turn on “situationspecific factual inquiries.”43 Guided by Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Penn Central, several factors aid in the factual
determination. First, the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant.44 Second, the interference of the regulation
with the distinct investment-backed expectations.45 Third,
the character of the government’s action.46 These factors
have become the court’s guideposts in regulatory takings
analyses.47

1. FACTORING IN TEMPORARINESS
For a fuller understanding of takings claims that

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018-20 (emphasis in original).
Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n, 568, U.S. at 32 (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
44 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
45 Id.
46 Id. (explaining that a taking is less likely when interference
arises “from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good”).
47 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
42
43
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could arise based on COVID-19-related orders, to be
described in Part III, it is helpful to consider the impact of
government actions (allegedly amounting to takings) that
are not permanent but temporary. After all, even the
sharpest critics of lockdown orders or COVID-19-related
restrictions likely believe they will eventually relax. And if
not, then temporariness need not be factored in, and the
analysis becomes simpler still.
As with the other rules described herein, a reader
need only look to the Supreme Court of the United States for
the general rule on temporary takings. In Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
Justice Stevens and the Court’s majority declined to issue a
categorical rule on temporary takings that admittedly
deprive all economically viable use for a time. 48 Instead, the
majority “conclude[d] that the circumstances in this case are
best analyzed within the Penn Central framework.”49
Thus, although a limitation may be less than
permanent, the temporality will affect the compensation but

48
49

535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
Id.
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not the underlying takings analysis.50

D. ENTER THE POLICE POWER
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the police power as
“a deeply ingrained [principle] in our constitutional history”
wherefrom “‘the Constitution created a Federal Government
of limited powers,’ while reserving a generalized police power
to the States.”51 “[O]ne of the most essential powers of
government, [and] one that is least limitable[,]” few
restrictions are placed on the police power of the state: it
must not be exercised arbitrarily52 and its exercise must not
violate the provisions of the Constitution.53 Consequently,
states have much leeway in exercising their police power.
Justices have taken their own interpretations as to
what exactly the power encompasses, with Chief Justice
Taney explaining that it may be invoked to prevent
“injurious” actions, “idleness, vice[s], or

debauchery”

amongst citizens.54 And Justice McClean asserted that the

Id.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n. 8 (2000) (quoting
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
52 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
53 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
54 Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 577 (1847).
50
51
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power could be used in “matters which relate to[] moral and
political welfare,”55 while Justice Grier said it could be used
to prohibit those things which may be “pernicious in [their]
effects, and the cause of disease, pauperism, and crime.”56
Justice Grier also said that “the preservation of the public
peace, health, and morals, must come within this category.”57
Famously, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, Justice
Harlan offered his explanation of the power: “the police
power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such
reasonable regulations established directly by legislative
enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety.”58 From there, Jacobson then quickly turns to the
limitations on the states’ power, holding:
The mode or manner in which those results
are to be accomplished is within the discretion
of the State, subject, of course, . . . only to the
condition that no rule prescribed by a State,
nor any regulation adopted by a local
governmental agency acting under the
sanction of state legislation, shall contravene
the Constitution of the United States or

Id. at 588.
Id. at 631.
57 Id.
58 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650,
661 (1885); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470 (1878); Beer Co. v.
Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
203 (1824)).
55
56
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infringe any right granted or secured by that
instrument.59

In so writing, the Court establishes that the state’s police
power is still confined to the bounds established by the
Constitution. So as to avoid any confusion on the issue,
Justice Harlan provides that rule in explicit terms, saying
“[a] local enactment or regulation, even if based on the
acknowledged police power of a State, must always yield in
case of conflict with the exercise by the General Government
of any power it possesses under the Constitution.” 60
More recently, Justices Brennan and Scalia have
stated in the context of Takings Clause cases that “where the
State reasonably concludes that the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of land, compensation need not
accompany prohibition.”61 Consequently, as the Court in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts held, the execution of the police
power does not escape review under the Constitution;
however, its effect on property will not be considered a

Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
61 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023
(1992) (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978))
(internal quotations omitted).
59
60
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taking, because it is not serving the constitutional command
of a “public use.”
The underlying principle of the police power as it
relates to takings is that the government is not acting to
“take” property because some “public use” may be had from
it; on the contrary, the government is preventing a public
bad.62 Of course, this principle has its own detractors, too, for
when the government prevents a public bad, it is inevitably
furthering a public good. After all, the Takings Clause is
“designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”63 Those detractors’
argument has yet to carry water.

1. CEDAR RUST MAY KILL BUT IT DOESN’T TAKE
A number of cases illustrate just what regulations
implicate the police power. Take, for example, Miller v.
Schoene.64 There, a Virginia entomologist, acting pursuant to
the Cedar Rust Act of Virginia, ordered the plaintiff to
destroy its cedar trees because they produced Cedar Rust, a

See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511 (1904).
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
64 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
62
63
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fatal disease to apple trees.65 The statute paid expenses
related to the costs of destroying the trees and allowed the
owners to keep and use the timber but did not provide
compensation for the decrease in value to the property or the
value of the trees themselves if they were permitted to live.66
The Court granted certiorari and unanimously upheld the
denial of compensation by the Virginia Supreme Court on the
takings claim.67
Cedar Rust, according to the Court, is an “infectious
plant disease . . . which is destructive of the fruit and foliage
of the apple, but without effect on the value of the cedar.”68
So, while the cedar trees obtained no benefit from the disease
they harbored, the nearby apple orchards were nearly
decimated by it. “The only practicable method of controlling
the disease and protecting the apple trees from its ravages
[was] the destruction of all red cedar trees . . . located within
two miles of apple orchards.”69
While the Court assumed that the cedar and apple

Id. at 277.
Id.
67 Id. at 281.
68 Id. at 278.
69 Id. at 278-79.
65
66
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trees’ continued presence was mutually exclusive (based on
the lower court’s finding), it said also that had Virginia
chosen not to take action to prevent the spread of the disease
to apple trees, that inaction could have been seen as harming
the apple trees (and, more importantly, their owners).70
Thus, “when forced to such a choice[,] the state does not
exceed its constitutional [police ]powers by deciding upon the
destruction of one class of property to save another which, in
the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the
public.”71 Moreover, where the public interest confronts a
private, individual interest, even the destruction of the latter
is ordinary and acceptable in the exercise of the police
power—and is not a compensable taking.72
The lesson learned from these apple trees is that
when a government vested with the police power acts to
prevent harm it is not acting pursuant to its taking authority
under the Fifth Amendment but its inherent authority under

Id. at 279.
Id. at 280.
72 Id. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
70
71
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the police power.

III. RELEVANCE OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO COVID-19
Rather than a national survey of COVID-19-related
orders, this paper shall, in Part III.C, evaluate and recount
Tennessee’s approach—a notably conservative and relatively
limited one—in an effort to make palatable in a few
paragraphs what has taken more than one and a half years
to develop. First, though, let us set the scene with the factual
origins of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

A. WHAT JUST HAPPENED: A BRIEF RECOUNTING OF
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
To be clear, this is not a scientific paper, nor is its
purpose to litigate political, social, or otherwise non-takings
topics. Information relating to the origins, continued
timeline, and approaches to curbing the effects of the
COVID-19 Pandemic continue to develop, and readers should
be careful to note modifications and updates to statements
made herein. Now, away with the disclaimers!
All are now familiar with the term COVID-19—
whether they want to be or not— as the common name for
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the SARS-CoV-2 Virus.73 The first known cases originated in
Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, in mid-December 2019.74
The first reported case in the United States was confirmed
in Washington state on January 20, 2020,75 and the first
death occurred in Santa Clara County, California on
February 6, 2020.76
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar
declared a public health emergency on January 31, 2020,77
and President Trump declared a national state of emergency
on March 13, 2020.78 While further descriptions relating to
caseloads, vaccine development, and political happenings are
interesting and could be a helpful contribution to legal
scholarship, they do not fit squarely within the topic to be

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, SARS-CoV-2
Variant Classifications and Definitions, (last visited Oct. 4, 2021),
available at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/variants/variant-info.html.
74 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Museum
COVID-19 Timeline, (last visited Nov. 5, 2021), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html.
75 Id.
76 Bill Chappell, 1st Known U.S. COVID-19 Death Was Weeks
Earlier Than Previously Thought, NPR (Apr. 22, 2020, 10:04 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/22/
840836618/1st-known-u-s-covid-19-death-was-on-feb-6-a-postmortem-test-reveals.
77 Alex Azar, Determination that a Public Health Emergency
Exists, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/20
19-nCoV.aspx.
78 Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020).
73
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addressed here.
In other words, many other significant aspects of the
COVID-19 Pandemic will not be described here—each with
its own potential legal significance. Therefore, the gaps in
the timeline from this point forward represent developments
that simply do not aid in this particular discussion. Readers
can and should find those developments from other trusted
sources.

B. TENNESSEE’S APPROACH: ORDERS, MANDATES,
CLOSURES, OH MY!

AND

Tennessee Governor Bill Lee issued Executive Order
(“EO”) 14 (together “EO 14”) on March 12, 2020, declaring a
state of emergency in Tennessee, following the lead of at
least seven other jurisdictions.79 That EO suspended many
trade and health regulations aimed at facilitating a faster
response to anticipated medical needs in Tennessee.80 Soon,
though, EO 15 was issued, repealing EO 14 and providing a
more lengthy and substantive response to the COVID-19
Pandemic.81
Asserting power under Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Exec. Order No. 14 (Mar. 12, 2020).
Id.
81 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 15 (Mar. 19, 2020).
79
80
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section 58-2-107(e)—and just how reassuring is it that the
governor’s power to “suspend laws and rules regarding the
conduct of state business”82 is buried in the Title 58, Chapter
2, Section 107, Paragraph e!—Governor Lee lifted myriad
restrictions on truck drivers, construction crews, nurses,
pharmacists, physicians, insurance companies, and other
“health care workers” with the stroke of his pen.83
Two days after the first COVID-19-related death
occurred in Tennessee on March 20, 2020,84 Governor Lee
issued EO 17, banning social gatherings of more than ten
persons and prohibiting indoor dining, gym use, and
visitation to nursing homes or assisted-living facilities.85 To
be fair though, and with great wisdom and timeliness, the
Governor did grant some leniency as relates to restaurants
serving to-go alcoholic beverages, allowing take-out orders to
include certain alcoholic beverages otherwise in violation of
open-container laws.86

Id. at 2.
See id.
84 See CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TIMELINE OF COVID-19 & EXEC. ORDERS
(last visited Nov. 7, 2021), available at https://knoxvilletn.gov/
government/mayors_office/c_o_v_i_d-19___coronavirus_/timeline_
of_c_o_v_i_d-19___executive_orders.
85 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 17, at 2-3 (Mar. 22, 2020).
86 See id. at 4.
82
83
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Perhaps what is most notable about EO 17 was the

asserted breadth of its next-to-last provision: “Any state or
local law, order, rule, or regulation inconsistent with this
Order is hereby suspended.” 87 That is a breathtaking
assertion of power, reminiscent of Louis XIV’s famous
declaration: “L’État c’est moi”88—perhaps Governor Lee has
some French blood?
A day later, the Governor ordered dentists, hospitals,
and other outpatient service providers to end all nonemergency procedures.89 That same EO “requested and
encouraged” non-hospital healthcare providers to surrender
personal protective equipment (“PPE”) (masks, gowns,
gloves, etc.) to the Tennessee Emergency Management
Agency.90 Note, the surrender of PPE was a request at this
point, not a mandate.
By this time, some municipalities in Tennessee (with
their own governing health boards) had instituted countywide stay-at-home orders, including Nashville, Knoxville,

Id. at 5.
Roughly translated to “I am the State.”
89 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 18, at 2 (Mar. 23, 2020).
90 Id at 2-3.
87
88
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and Memphis.91 Governor Lee followed suit on March 30,
2020, ordering:
Businesses or organizations that do not
perform Essential Services shall not be open
for access or use by the public or its members.
Such businesses or organizations are strongly
encouraged to provide delivery, including
delivery curbside outside of the business or
organization, of online or telephone orders, to
the greatest extent practicable, and persons
are encouraged to use any such options to
support such businesses during this
emergency.92
This EO also “urged [Tennesseans ]to stay at home, except
for when engaging in Essential Activity or Essential Services
. . . .”93 Three days later, “urged” became “required.”94 Other
EOs further suspended the regulations originally lifted by
EO 15,95 prevented dental and other healthcare-related

See METRO PUB. HEALTH DEP’T OF NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON CTY,
SAFER AT HOME ORDER, (Mar. 15, 2020), available at
https://www.asafenashville.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Amended-and-Restated-ORDER-3FINAL.pdf; KNOX CTY HEALTH DEP’T, SAFER AT HOME ORDER,
(Mar. 23, 2020), available at
https://knoxvilletn.gov/UserFiles/Servers/Server_109478/File/May
orsOffice/Covid19/knoxcounty-safer-at
-home-order.pdf; City of Memphis Exec. Order No. 03-2020 (Mar.
23, 2020), available at https://covid19.memphistn.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/76/2020/03/Executive-Order-No-03-2020.pdf.
92 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 22, at 3 (Mar. 30, 2020).
93 Id. at 2-3.
94 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 23 (Apr. 2, 2020).
95 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 24, at 2-3 (Apr. 3, 2020).
91
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procedures originally suspended in EO 18,96 and created new
legal provisions allowing for remote notarizations or
witnessing for document executions.97

C. TO BE OR NOT TO BE: THE END OF THE PANDEMIC
Governor Lee’s first EO to turn in a new direction was
issued on April 24, 2020, allowing dine-in service to reopen
in Tennessee, save in the “six locally run county health
departments[,]” which

could determine independently

whether to reopen indoor dining.98

99

Of course, those

counties include the more-highly populated cities like
Nashville, Knoxville, Memphis, Chattanooga, Bristol, and
Kingsport.100
Although “[s]ocial gatherings of ten (10) or more
remain[ed] prohibited[,]” Governor Lee allowed the return to
work of millions of Tennesseans, effective April 29, 2020.101
EO 30 also “strongly urged” employers to take precautions
against COVID-19 and extended the variance for alcohol

Tenn. Exec. Order No. 25, at 2 (Apr. 8, 2020).
Tenn. Exec. Order No. 26, at 2-3 (Apr. 9, 2020).
98 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 29, at 2-3 (Apr. 24, 2020).
99 See e.g., Knox Cty Code § 38-33(a) (granting power to the Knox
County Board of Health to act as the independent board for Knox
County related to health regulations).
100 See Tenn. Exec. Order No. 29, at 2 (Apr. 24, 2020).
101 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 30, at 2-3 (Apr. 28, 2020).
96
97
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sales for take-out or delivery food services, but continued the
mandatory closure of “close-contact personal services” like
barbershops, salons, and spas, as well as entertainment
venues like bars, night clubs, amusement parks, and concert
venues.102
A week later, though, the Governor issued new
guidance for reopening and allowed the close-contact service
providers to reopen.103 And, two days after that, EO 35
allowed entertainment venues to reopen if they could
accommodate a 10-person maximum and maintain a social
distance of 6 feet.104 Finally, using words like “encouraged”
and “imperative,” the Governor issued EO 38, allowing all
Tennesseans to return to work unless they exhibited
symptoms of COVID-19.105 And, some restaurants or bars
still had capacity or distance restrictions, but they were
permitted to reopen for indoor service.106
The Governor continued to extend the suspension of
laws and regulations throughout 2020 and 2021, while also

Id. at 4-6.
Tenn. Exec. Order No. 33, at 2 (May 5, 2020).
104 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 35, at 2-3 (May 7, 2020).
105 Tenn. Exec. Order No. 38, at 2-3 (May 22, 2020).
106 Id. at 7.
102
103
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addressing masks107 and spectators at sporting events;108
however, no further sweeping EOs were issued to “lock
down” the state’s businesses or employers. In fact, EO 75
ended the restrictions on spectator sporting events at the
close of January, 2021.
All of these actions by the Governor applied to 89 of
Tennessee’s 95 counties.

D. CITIES AND COUNTIES FLEX THEIR MIGHT
Still, as if the Governor’s orders alone were not
enough, recall the six locally run health boards with rulemaking power.109 Their contribution to the morass of
regulations and orders should not go unnoticed.
Take, for example, the Knox County Board of Health.
On March 23, 2020, the Board of Health ordered all nonessential businesses, including restaurants, bars, and event
venues, closed.110 That restriction was not lifted until the
plan for phased reopening began on May 1, 2020, and even

See Tenn. Exec. Order No. 54, at 2 (July 3, 2020).
See Tenn. Exec. Order No. 70, at 3 (Dec. 20, 2020).
109 See e.g., Tenn. Exec. Order No. 29 (Apr. 24, 2020) (including
Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Shelby, Sullivan, and Madison
counties).
110 KNOX CTY BD. OF HEALTH, KNOX COUNTY SAFER AT HOME ORDER
(Mar. 23, 2020), available at
https://knoxvilletn.gov/UserFiles/Servers/Server_109478/File/May
orsOffice/Covid19/knoxcounty-safer-at-home-order.pdf.
107
108
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then the opening was subject to conditions precedent (e.g.,
community-wide

caseloads,

testing

capacities,

table

distances of 6 feet, etc.).111 It would seem reasonable to say
that, for the most part, bars, restaurants, and some event
venues were pleased to reopen, even with the new
restrictions in place.
Regulation 2020-3 ordered the closure of bars again
in Knox County for indoor service on July 30, 2020, some
three months later.112 That closure continued until August 6,
when the Board of Health issued a new curfew on bar service
at 10:00 pm.113 On September 17, 2020, citing an intent to
regulate all businesses that serve alcoholic beverages
equally, the curfew was extended to 11:00 pm, and other
businesses were included under the umbrella of this
policy.114 A discerning and questioning reader will ask why

See KNOX CTY BD. OF HEALTH, A COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR
PHASED REOPENING at 8 (Apr. 30, 2020), available at
https://knoxvilletn.gov/UserFiles/Servers/Server_109478/File/May
orsOffice/Covid19/COVID-Reopen-Plan.pdf.
112 KNOX CTY BD. OF HEALTH, COVID-19 SUPPRESSION IN BARS
REGULATION, Reg. No. 2020-3 (July 30, 2020), available at
https://covid.knoxcountytn.gov/pdfs/Regulation-2020-3.pdf.
113 KNOX CTY BD. OF HEALTH, REVISED COVID-19 SUPPRESSION IN
BARS REGULATION, Reg. No. 2020-4 (Aug. 6, 2020), available at
https://covid.knoxcountytn.gov/pdfs/Regulation-2020-4.pdf.
114 KNOX CTY BD. OF HEALTH, CURFEW REGARDING THE SALE OR
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN CERTAIN
111
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that one hour makes a difference, and how a curfew itself
serves to slow the spread—both questions providing a basis
for further scholarship, though perhaps in a medical journal.
Without going into every regulation decreed by each
of the six independent boards of health in Tennessee, it
would not be an exaggeration to say that Knox County’s
approach was similar to that of other municipalities, at least
in Tennessee.115

IV. SATISFACTION OF BUSINESSES WITH THE RESULT
Whether the Takings Clause is implicated may
depend on any number of things, but the one focused on here
is the relevance of the so-called police power. If the police
power is used to modify an individual’s rights in his or her
property (e.g., closing non-essential businesses to prevent
the spread of COVID-19 or implementing curfews on bars
and indoor dining), because those rights, if acted upon, are
believed to be “detrimental to public interests[,]” 116 then the

ESTABLISHMENTS REGULATION, Reg. No. 2020-5 (Sept. 17, 2020),
available
at
https://covid.knoxcountytn.gov/pdfs/
20200917171409574.pdf.
115 See Kaylin Jorge, Open or Closed? Here’s the county-by-county
breakdown of Tennessee restaurants, FOX17, (Apr. 27, 2020),
available at https://fox17.com/news/local/heres-the-county-bycounty-breakdown-of-tennessee-restaurants-reopening-orstaying-closed.
116 FREUND, supra note 62.

THE TAKINGS CLAUSE CONFRONTS THE POLICE POWER 167
Takings Clause has not been implicated, because the
government has not extracted a public use but has forbidden
a public harm.
With the police power, the property rights of the
individual are not impaired because those property rights
are better served with public use; rather, those rights are
alleged to be harmful to the public at large.117 So long as the
act in question is “a legitimate regulation, operating alike
upon all who [come] within its terms[,]” then the exercise of
police power will not be invalidated.118

A. AN EXAMPLE IN PRACTICE
Dozens of cases have already been brought, seeking
injunctions, restitution, or other remedies from the alleged
harm of orders similar to those laid out in Parts III.B and
III.C. Perhaps most closely addressing the rules described
hereinabove is TJM 64 Inc. v. Harris, a case brought in the
Western District of Tennessee. 119 Seeking an injunction
against Shelby County Mayor Lee Harris, a conglomeration
of restaurants and their owners sued to enjoin the closure of

Id.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409 (1915), aff’g Ex Parte
Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 423 (Cal. 1913).
119 TJM 64 Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp.3d 828 (W.D. Tenn. 2020).
117
118
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“limited service restaurants” [sic] in that county.120
As the court put it there, plaintiffs asserted that
Shelby County Health Directive 8 (“Directive 8”)121 was a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for
exacting a regulatory taking by depriving the owners of these
specific businesses of all economically beneficial use of their
respective property.122 Alternatively, if the taking did not
meet the standard of a categorical taking enunciated in
Lucas (depriving all economically beneficial use), the
plaintiffs asserted that the Penn Central test applied and
that Directive 8 was still an uncompensated taking.123
Although the court addressed the issue based on the
underlying question as to whether a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”) should be granted,124 its analysis as to the

Id. at 831-33.
SHELBY CTY HEALTH DEP’T, FORMAL ISSUANCE OF HEALTH
ORDER AND DIRECTIVE NO. 8, at 3 (July 7, 2020), available at
https://www.shelbytnhealth.com/DocumentCenter/View/1761/Hea
lth-Directive-No-8-7-7-20 (providing that “all businesses and
services in Shelby County may open for business with the following
exceptions: 1) Bars, Limited Service Restaurants, and Clubs as
defined at https://www.tn.gov/abc/licensing/liquor-by-the-drinklicenses.html 2) Adult entertainment venues; . . . 3) Schools . . . 4)
Festivals, fairs, parades, large scale sporting events, and large
scale community events. . . .”).
122 TJM 64 Inc. at 832-33 (citing Compl. at 5, 10, TJM 64 Inc. v.
Harris, 475 F. Supp.3d 828 (W.D. Tenn. 2020)).
123 Id.
124 See id. at 833-34.
120
121
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takings claim remains insightful. The court found that no
categorical taking had occurred against the plaintiff bars and
restaurants because Directive 8 did not prevent all
economically beneficial use—the bars and restaurants were
still permitted to provide take-out service.125 The court did
not address whether a club had suffered a categorical taking
by the government’s preventing it from opening or providing
service to customers.126 As for a regulatory taking under
Penn Central, the court analyzed each of the factors in turn.
Recall the Penn Central test’s factors: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the
interference of the regulation with the distinct investmentbacked

expectations,

and

(3)

the

character

of

the

government’s action.127
The court conceded that the owners’ distinct
investment-backed

expectations

supported

finding

a

regulatory taking had occurred, noting that plaintiffs
invested in their businesses to operate clubs, restaurants,
and bars, and that their expectations of profits had been

Id. at 838.
See id. at 837-38.
127 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
125
126
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dashed by Directive 8.128 Moreover, the economic impact of
the regulation was deemed exceedingly negative in terms of
its effect on the businesses,129 putting factors one and two in
the plaintiff’s column. However, factor three would overcome
the first two, as the court found that the “character of
Defendants' actions and the context in which Defendants
find themselves, here facing a national public health
emergency, cut strongly against a finding that the COVID19 Closure Orders amount to regulatory takings.”130
What the court omitted in order to skip past the
categorical taking claim and reach the Penn Central test is
most telling. To move past the categorical taking claim, the
court noted that some alternatives for revenue production
existed (e.g., carry-out, delivery, etc.) for restaurants and
bars. The court, as stated earlier, did not mention how a club
or non-food-or-drink-service provider would find another
source of revenue. Moreover, the court—just a few
paragraphs after saying that not all economically beneficial
use had been prevented—held that the businesses “will

Id. at 838.
Id.
130 Id. at 839.
128
129
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likely be out of business in the next two or three months if
[Directive 8] remains in effect[,]” and that the economic
consequences would be “disastrous.”131
Admittedly, the court steered fairly clear of the police
power’s effect, instead choosing to analyze the takings claim
pursuant to Penn Central. The court in TJM 64 Inc. did use
parenthetical explanations as to why the character of the
government action—exercising

the

police

power—was

important, but the court should not have even reached the
question under Penn Central. As this essay has explained, to
reach the regulatory takings analysis under Penn Central is
not the proper disposition of a case brought against the
effects of an order promulgated under the police power. The
court should have (more easily, in fact) applied the rule used
in numerous cases,132 just like the apple trees in Miller v.
Schoene, and refused to grant the TRO because Directive 8
was not aimed at providing a “public use” but preventing a

Id. at 838.
See e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926); Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915);
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
131
132
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public harm.133
Recall Justice Scalia’s words in Lucas: “where the
State reasonably concludes that the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting
particular contemplated uses of land, compensation need not
accompany prohibition.”134

B. WHY THOSE EMPLOYERS, BUSINESSES, AND
INDIVIDUALS ARE DISCONTENT
Imagine for a moment that the year is 2019 and you
have just applied for a $200,000.00 line of credit to renovate
a second-floor bar in the Old City in Knoxville, Tennessee.
The bank gives you the money based on your proposed
business model—an Irish pub called “O’Malley’s,” serving
authentic ales, fish-n-chips in a newspaper, and happy hour
specials that are sure to draw a crowd—you sign the lease,
hire a staff, and order equipment. You complete your
renovations in early Fall 2019, opening up just in time for
the 2019 SEC football season. After three months of good
business, the cold weather slows your crowd and profitability

See FREUND, supra note 62.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023
(1992) (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978))
(internal quotations omitted).
133
134
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seems a bleak prospect.
O’Malley’s still owes $195,000 on the line of credit, the
wait and cook staffs all expect paychecks, the landlord
expects her $7,500 rent payment at the close of the month,
and that still leaves insurance, payroll taxes, licensing fees,
and food costs to front. Then, on March 23, 2020, the Knox
County Board of Health orders the closure of the new pub,
along with all the others like it. O’Malley’s is permitted to
offer carry-out services and delivery options, neither of which
will make ends meet. After all, it would take more than
$20,000 in revenue to cover expenses. Still, you try the carryout and delivery options and bring in $6,000 in April, an
average of $200 per day, which doesn’t even cover the rent,
much less the other expenses you face this month.
It goes without saying, the hypothetical O’Malley’s is
not the only business to have faced this life-changing ordeal.
Economists at the Federal Reserve estimate that some
additional 200,000 businesses closed as a result of the
Pandemic, in addition to the usual 600,000 per year closure
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that has been the norm in the U.S. economy.135 That means
an estimated 800,000 businesses in 2020 closed their doors
forever. And the hardest hit sector? Those same Fed
economists estimate that barbershops, nail salons, and
personal service providers closed at a rate higher than any
other sector.136
As the above Parts explain, when a government acts via its
inherent police powers, those actions do not escape
constitutional review. However, should O’Malley’s claim
that the government’s lockdown order “took” its property in
such a way that compensation is required under the Fifth
Amendment, the claim would inevitably and invariably fail.
Recall that under the Fifth Amendment, some “public use”
must be furthered by the taking. Further, when the
government acts to “protect the public health and public
safety[,]”137 the police power’s role is not providing a public
use but preventing a public harm.138 Thus, the Takings
Clause will not demand compensation.
So, technically, the government has issued its
regulations pursuant to its inherent authority under the
police power—it owes you nothing, nada, zilch. Would you be
content with that result?
Does that align with the rationale for the Takings

LELAND D. CRANE ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES.
SYS., BUSINESS EXIT DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: NONTRADITIONAL MEASURES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 4 (Apr. 2021),
available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/
2020089r1pap.pdf.
136 Id. at 2.
137 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (internal
citations omitted).
138 FREUND, supra note 62.
135
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Clause, as explained by Justice Hugo Black? —“The Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”139
Does it adhere to the admonition issued by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal? “[A] strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.”140
Perhaps the answer to these two questions is “no.”
Perhaps the public should bear the costs of what has been
placed on bars, event venues, barbershops, nail salons, and
the like. Most restaurateurs, hairstylists, and bar owners
probably agree that they alone should not be saddled with
those costs. But, as Marine Corps General Mulholland told
Captain Benjamin Franklin Pierce in an episode of
M*A*S*H: “There’s not thing one you can do about it.”141

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
141 M*A*S*H: Tell It to the Marines (CBS-TV television broadcast
Jan. 12, 1981).
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